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This dissertation consists of three independent essays in 
labor and public economics. Chapter 1, the main chapter, 
presents evidence on the substitutability between workers 
within a fi rm, and between incumbent workers and outsid-
ers, which matter for understanding the operation of internal 
labor markets and the consequences of worker turnover. 
To assess the substitutability of workers, I estimate how 
exogenous worker exits affect a fi rm’s demand for incumbent 
workers and new hires. Using matched employer-employee 
data based on the universe of German social security records, 
I analyze the effects of 34,000 unexpected worker deaths and 
show that these worker exits on average raise the remain-
ing workers’ wages and retention probabilities for a period 
of several years. These fi ndings are diffi cult to reconcile 
with frictionless labor markets and perfect substitutability 
between incumbent workers and outsiders. The average 
effect masks substantial heterogeneity: coworkers in the 
same occupation as the deceased see positive wage effects; 
coworkers in other occupations instead experience wage 
decreases when a high-skilled worker or manager dies. Thus, 
coworkers in the same occupation appear to be substitutes, 
while high-skilled workers and managers appear to be 
complements to coworkers in other occupations. Finally, 
when the external labor market in the deceased’s occupation 
is thin, incumbents’ wages respond more and external hiring 
responds less to a worker death. The results suggest that thin 
external markets for skills lead to higher fi rm-specifi city of 
human capital and lower replaceability of incumbents.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Peter Ganong, 
proposes a permutation test for the Regression Kink (RK) 
design—an increasingly popular empirical method for causal 
inference. Analogous to the Regression Discontinuity design, 
which evaluates discontinuous changes in the level of an 
outcome variable with respect to the running variable at a 
point at which the level of a policy changes, the RK design 
evaluates discontinuous changes in the slope of an outcome 
variable with respect to the running variable at a kink point 
at which the slope of a policy with respect to the running 
variable changes. Using simulation studies based on data 
from existing RK designs, we document empirically that the 
statistical signifi cance of RK estimators based on conven-
tional standard errors can be spurious. In the simulations, 
false positives arise as a consequence of nonlinearities in 
the underlying relationship between the outcome and the 
assignment variable. As a complement to standard RK infer-
ence, we propose that researchers construct a distribution of 
placebo estimates in regions with and without a policy kink 
and use this distribution to gauge statistical signifi cance. 
Under the assumption that the location of the kink point is 
random, this permutation test has exact size in fi nite samples 
for testing a sharp null hypothesis of no effect of the policy 
on the outcome. We document using simulations that our 
method improves on the size of standard approaches.
Chapter 3, which is joint work with Johannes Abeler and 
published in Abeler and Jäger (2015), analyzes a laboratory 
experiment to study how tax complexity affects people’s 
reactions to tax changes. In the experiment, subjects work for 
a piece rate and face taxes. One treatment features a simple 
tax system, the other is complex. The payoff-maximizing 
output level and the incentives around this optimum are, 
however, identical across treatments. We introduce the same 
sequence of additional taxes in both treatments. Subjects in 
the complex treatment underreact to new taxes; some ignore 
new taxes entirely. The underreaction is stronger for subjects 
with lower cognitive ability. Contrary to predictions from 
models of rational inattention, subjects are equally likely to 
ignore large or small incentive changes.
Summary of Chapter 1: How Substitutable Are Workers? 
Evidence from Worker Deaths
The fl uidity of labor markets depends on the ease with 
which the two sides of the market can switch trading part-
ners: workers fi nding alternative employment suitable for 
their skills and fi rms fi nding adequate substitutes for their 
current workers. An extensive body of empirical litera-
ture sheds light on the workers’ perspective and fi nds that 
workers who are displaced from their jobs suffer persistent 
earnings losses—consistent with Becker’s (1962) idea that 
human capital has fi rm-specifi c components.1 However, 
much less is known about the other side of the market: fi rms’ 
ability to fi nd substitutes for their workers, in particular ones 
with specifi c human capital. When a worker leaves a fi rm, 
how easily can the fi rm replace the worker externally through 
hiring, and how do such worker exits affect the fi rm’s 
demand for its remaining workers? Several debates—ranging 
from the role of labor pooling as a source of agglomeration 
(Marshall 1890) to the importance of intrafi rm bargaining 
(Stole and Zwiebel 1996a,b)—hinge directly on the answer 
to this question.
I offer an empirical answer to this question by estimat-
ing the effects of exogenous worker exits on hiring, and on 
the fi rm’s demand for the labor of the remaining workers. I 
then use the results to adjudicate between different models 
of the labor market—in particular, different assumptions 
about the substitutability of workers. I illustrate the intuition 
underlying my approach in a simple conceptual framework 
that demonstrates how different assumptions about worker 
substitutability alter the predictions for the sign and mag-
nitude of the effects of worker exits. The competitive labor 
market model assumes that outside workers are perfect 
substitutes for incumbent workers and thus predicts that the 
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effect of worker exits on the fi rm’s labor demand for the 
remaining insiders is zero: the fi rm can simply hire a suitable 
new worker in response to a worker exit so that its demand 
for the labor of the remaining workers remains unchanged. 
In contrast, when outsiders are only imperfect substitutes for 
insiders—for instance, because the fi rm’s production process 
relies on specifi c human capital—worker exits can affect the 
fi rm’s labor demand for incumbent workers. In bargaining 
models that incorporate such imperfect substitutability (see, 
e.g., Stole and Zwiebel [1996a,b]), the sign of the effect 
identifi es the substitutability of the exiting worker’s skills 
with those of the remaining workers: the fi rm’s labor demand 
rises for substitutes and, in contrast, falls for complements of 
the worker who exited.
To test these predictions, I implement a quasi-experimental 
research design and estimate the causal effect of unexpected 
worker deaths on hiring and on the remaining workers’ wages 
and retention rates based on the universe of German Social 
Security records.2 In a dynamic difference-in-differences 
design, I compare roughly 34,000 small fi rms that experi-
enced the death of a worker in a given year to a comparison 
group of fi rms with similar characteristics that did not expe-
rience a worker death that year. The research design relies on 
deaths as a source of variation to circumvent the endogeneity 
of worker exits. The sample excludes the deaths of workers 
who experienced a hospitalization or longer sickness spell 
in the fi ve years before their death in order to exclude deaths 
preceded by debilitating diseases. The outcomes in the treat-
ment and comparison group follow parallel trends in the years 
prior to the death of a worker in treatment group fi rms, sug-
gesting that outcomes in comparison group fi rms can be used 
to gauge what would have happened to workers in treatment 
group fi rms in the absence of a worker death.
Based on almost 7 million worker-year observations, I 
show that worker deaths affect fi rms’ demand for the labor 
of their remaining workers. On average, incumbent work-
ers in the treatment group experience a highly statistically 
signifi cant earnings increase of about 0.6 percent in the 
year after the death.3 Over the course of the fi ve years after 
the death, the average cumulative effect on the earnings of 
all incumbent workers in a treatment group fi rm is close to 
6,000 EUR (2010 CPI), corresponding to about 18 percent 
of an average deceased worker’s annual earnings. Moreover, 
incumbent workers in the treatment group are more likely to 
retain employment at the same fi rm and are less likely to be 
employed at other fi rms; their probability of (any) employ-
ment does not change in response to a worker death. Worker 
deaths do not affect incumbents’ working hours at the part-
time versus full-time margin.4
In a next step, I leverage the research design to esti-
mate within-fi rm heterogeneity across occupation and skill 
groups and fi nd substantial heterogeneity, shedding light on 
the interdependencies between workers and the sources of 
frictions in replacing workers. The positive wage effects of 
worker exits are concentrated among incumbent workers in 
the same occupation group as the deceased.5 For deaths of 
workers in high-skilled occupations, I estimate statistically 
signifi cant, negative effects on the wages of incumbent work-
ers in other occupations. Similarly, wage effects on incum-
bent workers in other occupations are negative in the case of 
deaths of managers.6 Turning the focus to measures of human 
capital specifi city of the deceased, I fi nd evidence suggest-
ing that longer-tenured workers and workers in specialized 
occupations are harder to replace with outsiders.7
Since the evidence indicates that worker exits affect fi rms’ 
demand for incumbents, my fi ndings are hard to reconcile 
with frictionless labor markets and perfect substitutability 
between incumbents and outsiders and instead point to a set 
of models in which fi rms face frictions in replacing workers 
externally. In particular, the fi ndings accord with Becker’s 
(1964) conjecture that fi rms share rents with workers to keep 
workers with specifi c human capital from quitting.8 The fi nd-
ing of positive wage effects on coworkers in the same occu-
pation as the deceased supports this view, because workers 
in the same occupation are arguably closer substitutes than 
workers in different occupations and therefore become more 
valuable to the fi rm as a consequence of a coworker exit. 
The fi nding of negative wage effects of deaths of workers in 
high-skilled occupations on incumbents in other occupations 
indicates imperfect substitutability between high- and low-
skilled labor. My fi ndings thereby support a key assumption 
of models positing that skilled workers raise the productivity 
of other workers at the same fi rm (see, e.g., Lucas [1978]; 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [1991]; Rosen [1982]), and 
constitute fi rm-level evidence consistent with studies of how 
marketwide labor supply shocks—for example, due to immi-
gration or changes in the college graduation rate—affect the 
wage structure (see, e.g., Card [2009]; Dustmann, Ludsteck, 
and Schönberg [2009]; Goldin and Katz [2008]; and Katz 
and Murphy [1992]).9
The validity of my interpretation of the empirical results 
as evidence regarding the substitutability of workers depends 
on whether alternative mechanisms can account for my fi nd-
ings. I consider three alternative explanations and evaluate 
them in light of the evidence: 1) changes in the remaining 
workers’ compensating differential for working at the fi rm, 
2) job assignment purely based on seniority, and 3) search 
frictions without human capital specifi city. None of the 
alternative mechanisms matches all of the evidence. The fi rst 
alternative explanation, for instance, builds on the hypothesis 
that incumbent worker wages may have gone up as a result 
of a worker death increasing the compensating differential 
for working at the fi rm—for example, due to decreased 
utility of interacting with colleagues or increases in the 
perception of job hazards. While such labor supply–driven 
explanations could explain why wages increase, they would 
simultaneously predict that workers’ probability of staying 
with the fi rm should decrease. The data, however, reject this 
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explanation as both wages and the probability of staying 
at the fi rm go up. Therefore, positive shifts in fi rms’ labor 
demand dominate any negative shocks to incumbent work-
ers’ labor supply. Several results are in confl ict with the other 
alternative explanations. For example, the second explana-
tion posits that workers may be perfect substitutes but rise 
through the ranks purely based on seniority. However, this 
explanation cannot account for the fi nding that wage effects 
of high-skilled worker deaths are negative. In contrast, 
models in which insiders and outsiders as well as high- and 
low-skilled workers are imperfect substitutes are consistent 
with the evidence.
To shed light on the sources of frictions in replacing 
workers, I study heterogeneity by external labor market 
conditions and fi nd that fi rms in thicker markets for special-
ized skills change incumbent wages by less and hire more 
externally in response to a worker death. The investigation 
is motivated by Marshall’s (1890) conjecture that fi rms and 
workers in thicker, more agglomerated labor markets face 
fewer frictions in fi nding a suitable match and tests Lazear’s 
(2009) theory according to which the specifi city of human 
capital depends on the thickness of the market.10 I investigate 
the role of market thickness by estimating heterogeneity 
across labor markets which vary in the relative agglomera-
tion of workers in the deceased’s occupation.11 Wage effects 
are smaller in labor markets with a higher concentration of 
workers in the relevant occupation. Consistent with a labor 
market thickness mechanism, the difference between thick 
and thin labor markets is larger for occupations with a high 
degree of specialization. Additional evidence shows that 
fi rms in thicker labor markets are more likely to hire a new 
worker externally when a worker in a specialized occu-
pation dies. Taken together, my fi ndings support Lazear’s 
(2009) theory of fi rm-specifi c human capital and suggest that 
frictions in replacing workers are larger in thin markets, in 
which workers’ skills are more fi rm-specifi c.
This paper contributes to several additional strands of 
the literature. Its results provide direct evidence supporting 
the key assumption of intrafi rm bargaining models (Stole 
and Zwiebel 1996a,b)—imperfect substitutability between 
incumbent workers and outsiders—and thereby resolve an 
open debate in the literature.12 By shedding light on the 
frictions that fi rms face in replacing workers externally, my 
study adds to a literature—going back to Slichter (1919) and 
Oi (1962)—that estimates the costs of worker turnover.13 
While this literature focuses on gauging fi rms’ expenditure 
for recruiting, hiring, and training, my research design pro-
vides a complementary perspective by providing evidence 
on how turnover affects fi rms’ labor demand for incumbent 
workers and by showing that workers are harder to replace 
when their human capital is fi rm-specifi c. In doing so, my 
research design complements the extensive literature that 
assesses how fi rms’ profi tability affects wages (see, e.g., 
Blanchfl ower, Oswald, and Sanfey 1996; Card, Devicienti, 
and Maida 2013; Dickens and Katz [1987]; Slichter [1950]; 
and Van Reenen, 1996), as it provides direct evidence for 
a mechanism—human capital specifi city leading to imper-
fect substitutability between insiders and outsiders—that 
gives rise to such rent sharing. Finally, my research design 
provides new evidence for the importance of internal labor 
markets (Doeringer and Piore 1971) by showing how 
idiosyncratic shocks to fi rm-specifi c labor supply—that is, 
internal market forces—shape wages.14
Notes
 1.  See Davis and von Wachter (2011); Dustmann and Meghir 
(2005); Farber, Hall, and Pencavel (1993); Gibbons and Katz 
(1991); Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993); and Topel 
(1991). Additional evidence accords with extensions of 
Becker’s model in Gibbons and Waldman (2004) and Lazear 
(2009) that can account for occupation, industry, and fi rm spec-
ifi city of human capital (see Gathmann and Schönberg 2010; 
Gibbons and Katz 1992; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009; 
Neal 1995; Nedelkoska, Neffke, and Wiederhold 2015; Parent 
2000; and Poletaev and Robinson 2008).
 2. The use of deaths as a source of variation builds on previous 
work in Azoulay, Wang, and Zivin (2010); Becker and Hvide 
(2013); Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2006); 
Bennedsen et al. (2007); Fadlon and Nielsen (2015); Isen 
(2013); Jaravel, Petkova, and Bell (2015); Jones and Olken 
(2005); and Oettl (2012).
 3. The average fi rm in my sample has 14.5 employees in the year 
before a worker death.
 4. Even if in part due to changes in working hours, nonzero wage 
effects of worker exits indicate that the fi rm cannot costlessly 
hire perfect replacements for incumbents. The data contain 
information on the part-time and full-time status of workers, 
but not more fi ne-grained measures of working hours, such 
as overtime. My analysis of treatment effects on the intensive 
margin is therefore limited to the part-time versus full-time 
margin. I analyze this effect in several samples, including 
incumbent workers who were part-time employed at the time 
of the worker death, and fi nd no evidence for intensive-margin 
effects.
 5. In my main specifi cations, I consider workers in the same one-
digit group of the 2010 Classifi cation of Occupations (Klas-
sifi kation der Berufe 2010) as being in the same occupation 
group and defi ne workers in other occupations as the comple-
ment of that group.
 6. I classify workers as managers if they work in an occupation 
characterized by managerial, planning, and control activities, 
such as operation and work scheduling, supply management, 
and quality control and assurance.
 7. I proxy for specialization with a measure used in Bleakley 
and Lin (2012), who classify occupations as relying on more 
specifi c skills when the returns to experience are high, which 
can be thought of as capturing the importance of occupation-
specifi c capital (see, e.g., Kambourov and Manovskii [2009] 
and Shaw [1984, 1987]).
 8. My results provide support for ex post rent sharing. It would in 
principle still be possible that workers do not earn ex ante rents 
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if labor markets are competitive at the stage when workers 
enter fi rms.
  9.  Katz and Murphy (1992), for example, provide evidence that 
college- and high school–educated workers are imperfect 
substitutes and show that changes in the aggregate supply 
of college graduates are associated with in opposite-signed 
changes the college premium.
 10.  See Marshall (1890, p. 156): 
  [A] localized industry gains a great advantage 
from the fact that it offers a constant market for skill. 
Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are 
likely to fi nd a good choice of workers with the special 
skill which they require; while men seeking employ-
ment naturally go to places where there are many 
employers who need such skill as theirs and where 
therefore it is likely to fi nd a good market. The owner 
of an isolated factory, even if he has access to a plenti-
ful supply of general labour, is often put to great shifts 
for want of some special skilled labour; and a skilled 
workman, when thrown out of employment in it, has no 
easy refuge. 
  Lazear (2009) develops a model in which human capital is a 
combination of general skills and becomes more fi rm-specifi c 
in fi rms with more idiosyncratic skill requirements compared 
to the external market. This view of human capital specifi city 
contrasts with a dichotomous distinction of purely fi rm-specifi c 
and purely general skills.
 11.   I measure thickness at the 5-digit occupation × commuting 
zone level as the share of employment in the relevant occupa-
tion in that commuting zone relative to the nationwide share of 
employment in that occupation. I then classify 5-digit occu-
pation × commuting zone cells as a thin or thick labor market 
based on a median split. As an intuitive example, the labor 
market for mechanical engineers in Munich will be described 
as thick based on this measure if Munich has a high share of 
mechanical engineers relative to the overall share of mechani-
cal engineers in the German labor market.
12.   The canonical intrafi rm bargaining model of Stole and Zwiebel 
(1996a,b) relies crucially on the assumption that fi rms face 
frictions in replacing their workers externally (see applications 
in trade and macroeconomics in, e.g., Acemoglu and Hawkins 
[2014] and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding [2010]). Under 
the converse assumption that fi rms can hire perfectly substitut-
able replacement workers in the external labor market, the key 
result of overemployment in Stole and Zwiebel is overturned 
(de Fontenay and Gans 2003). Stole and Zwiebel (2003) 
themselves note that “empirical work is needed to make a com-
pelling case for one approach over the other” (p. 457). More 
recently, Elsby and Michaels (2013) assess that the “empirical 
validity of the Stole and Zwiebel bargaining solution has yet to 
be assessed.”
13.   See also the overview of estimates of hiring costs in Manning 
(2011).
14.   In an infl uential contribution, Doeringer and Piore (1971) 
describe hiring, wage, and career dynamics in internal labor 
markets in which the hiring of new workers is limited to 
lower-level “ports of entry,” higher-level vacancies are fi lled 
through internal promotions and wages are “shielded from the 
direct infl uences of competitive forces in the external market.” 
For existing tests of internal labor markets see, e.g., Baker, 
Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b); Lazear (1992); and Lazear 
and Oyer (2004a,b). Relatedly, Bertrand (2004) provides 
evidence on the relationship between import competition and 
the shielding of wages from external labor market conditions. 
A related literature tests empirically between contract and spot 
market models of the labor market by estimating the effect of 
past unemployment on wages (see, e.g., Beaudry and DiNardo 
[1991]). For overviews, see the surveys in Gibbons and Wald-
man (1999); Lazear and Oyer (2013); Oyer and Scott (2011); 
and Waldman (2013).
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